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Employment Research
growth is weak, labor force participation
is historically low, and deep concerns
remain, particularly about the low-wage
workforce. Temporary help agencies,
which hire a disproportionate share of
low-wage workers, are often touted
as providing a pathway to permanent,
better jobs for these workers, yet we see
strikingly low hire rates in our data, even
among those in temp-to-hire contracts.
Low conversion rates to permanent jobs
with clients reflect the fact that employers
are highly selective in making job offers
to temporary help workers, but they also
reflect skills deficits among the workers.
Performance problems or quits prior to
assignment completion drive a significant
share of temporary help assignment
terminations, with “soft skill” problems
such as tardiness and unexcused absences
notably high among the lower-paid
temporary workers. In sum, our data
indicate that the pathway to better jobs
via temporary help employment currently
is limited for low-wage workers.
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Contributes to Rising
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This article highlights findings from “The Rise of
Domestic Outsourcing and the Evolution of the German Wage Structure,” Upjohn Institute Working
Paper No. 15-244. To read the paper, please visit
research.upjohn.org/up_workingpapers/244/.
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he last three decades have seen a
thorough transformation of the nature
of the labor market, with large firms
increasingly relying on nontraditional
employment arrangements such as
outsourcing, temporary or contingent
work, offshoring, and subcontracting.
Across a wide range of industries,
firms have been focusing on their
“core competencies” and hiring outside
companies to provide services that were
once performed by their own employees,
such as cleaning, security, logistics, human
resources, or information technology.
Outsourcing to business service
providers potentially allows for reductions
in wages for the contracted-out jobs. The
outsourcing firms are often traditional
lead companies in sectors such as
manufacturing or finance, and they
typically offer the most attractive jobs,
with higher wages, increased job security,
strong worker representation, and union
coverage. Large employers may thus
find it beneficial to reduce the number
of direct employees who benefit from
such wage premia by outsourcing jobs to
subcontractors. These business service
firms compete fiercely with each other for
service contracts from large companies
on price, and since labor costs are a large
share of business service firms’ total costs,
this creates intense pressure to lower
wages and reduce benefits.
We analyze domestic labor service
outsourcing in Germany using detailed
administrative data on workers and firms.
We use the term domestic outsourcing

rather than offshoring, as it refers to a
form of outsourcing where the service
provider is located in the same country.
We document for the first time in detail
the increase in outsourced labor services
over the last three decades in Germany,
focusing in particular on cleaning,
security, logistics, and food services.
Figure 1 shows the share of all fulltime workers in business service firms
that provide cleaning, security, and
logistics services, as well as temporary
help agencies. In 1975 only 2 percent
of the German labor force worked for
such companies, but that number almost
quadrupled by 2008 to around 7 percent.
A substantial share of this rise is due to
the growth in both temp agency work and
business service firms. Since employment
in cleaning, security, and logistics
occupations has remained relatively
constant, this suggests that a much larger
share of these occupations are now
working for contractors.
In order to obtain credible effects of
outsourcing on wages, we develop a new
method of identifying a particular type
of outsourcing—on-site outsourcing—
which refers to situations where a large
employer spins out a group of workers
providing a particular service, such as
cafeteria workers, to a legally separate
business unit, such as a subsidiary or an
existing business service provider. In these
situations the outsourced workers still
work together and do essentially the same
job at the same physical location but for
a different employer. Such outsourcing
events can be identified in administrative
data sets using worker flows between
establishments.
The basic intuition is that if a group
of workers is contracted out at the same
time, this can be observed by following
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the establishment identifiers as well
as occupation and industry codes. For
example, if a group of workers splits off
from a large bank in year t − 1 and forms a
new establishment identifier in year t with
an industry code of “cafeteria,” this likely
indicates that the bank is outsourcing its
cafeteria staff. We compare workers who
are outsourced in these on-site outsourcing
events to workers in the same occupation
and industry who are not outsourced and
estimate how their wages change over
time.
Figure 2 shows the main estimates
of outsourcing’s effect on wages. While
wages of both groups of workers move
in parallel up to the year of outsourcing
(year 0 in the figure), they drop for the
outsourced workers as soon as outsourcing
occurs by about 2.5 percent. The wage
differential then keeps growing until it
reaches about 10 percent, approximately
5–10 years after outsourcing. This
suggests large and long-lasting wage
differentials between outsourced and
in-house jobs. Since these differences
also imply that outsourcing may lead to
substantial cost savings to employers, we
investigate whether firms that pay higher
wages relative to the market have a higher
likelihood of outsourcing any of their
labor services, and we do indeed find that
firms are significantly more likely to do
so the more they pay above market-level
wages.
Finally, we consider the relationship
between the documented impacts of
outsourcing in Germany and the broad
changes in the country’s wage structure
over the last three decades. Dustmann et
al. (2014) document a dramatic decline of
real wages at the lower end of the wage
distribution since the early 2000s. After a
decade of stagnation from 1990 to 2000,
real wages at the 15th percentile fell by
around 10 percent between 2000 and
2008.
Furthermore, Card, Heining, and
Kline (2013) observe that low-skill
workers are increasingly working
at low-paying establishments and
are increasingly concentrated in
establishments with homogenous
workforces where most workers have
similar occupations. Outsourcing provides
a natural explanation for this, since it
typically involves outsourcing low-skill
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Figure 1 Fraction of Full-Time Workers in Germany in Cleaning, Security, or
Logistics Business Service Firms or Temp Agencies, by Year
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SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.

Figure 2 The Effect of Outsourcing on Log Wages of Outsourced Workers in Germany
0.02
0.00
í0.02
í0.04
í0.06
í0.08
í0.10
í0.12
í0.14
í0.16
í0.18
0

5

10

Years relative to outsourcing

NOTE: The blue lines represent 95 percent confidence intervals. The figure shows the evolution of
wages for outsourced workers in food, cleaning, security, and logistics occupations relative to the
wages of workers in the same occupations and industries who are not outsourced. Year 0 is the
first year of outsourcing. The y-axis is measured in fraction of relative wage losses to obtain the
wage loss in percent multiply by 100.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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workers to very competitive low-paying
establishments. In addition, outsourcing
provides a natural explanation for the
increase in occupational sorting: since
business service firms are much more
homogenous (for example, in the typical
cleaning firm, about 60 percent of the
employees are cleaners), moving workers
from heterogeneous lead employers to
business service firms that employ largely
the same occupations as the outsourced
worker will increase the overall
occupational assortativeness.
We quantify the contribution of
outsourcing to the rise in wage inequality
in Germany using a reweighting
method, which allows us to calculate
a counterfactual distribution of wages
in Germany under the scenario that
outsourcing did not increase since the
1980s. Figure 3 shows the evolution
of different percentiles of the wage
distribution relative to 1985. Especially
for low wages, outsourcing contributed
substantially to the increase in inequality.
Overall we show that about 9 percent of
the increase in inequality can be accounted

for by the increase in outsourcing of
just these four occupations. Since many
other tasks experienced an increase in
outsourcing, this should be viewed as a
lower bound with the overall contribution
of all forms of outsourcing to wage
inequality possibly being much larger.
The labor market has seen a fundamental
restructuring in recent decades, with lead
employers increasingly contracting out
parts of their noncore labor force.
This reorganization of the production
structure changes the employment
relationship for a large share of the
workforce. As more workers become
employed by specialized business service
firms, they find themselves working for
companies that provide narrow products
and compete fiercely with similar firms
for contracts with lead companies. This
creates pressure to reduce costs and lower
wages, which likely makes up a large
share of input costs among these types of
business service providers.
This restructuring also drastically
changes the bargaining environment, as
the price competition among business

Figure 3 The Contribution of Oursourcing of Cleaning, Security, and Logistics
Occupations to the Rise in Wage Inequality in Germany
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NOTE: The figure shows the percentage change in wages relative to 1985 at the 15th, 50th, and 85th
percentiles of the wage distribution for full-time men. The blue lines show the evolution of the
actual wage distribution, while the red lines show how the wage distribution would have evolved
if outsourcing for cleaning, security, and logistics workers had not increased relative to 1985.
SOURCE: Authors’ calculations.
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service firms makes it difficult for
outsourced workers to bargain for a share
of the firm rents at the lead company. In
this article, we provide careful estimates
of how this translates into lower wages
for outsourced workers, and we find
that across a wide range of measures,
outsourcing reduces wages by around
10 percent. Our method implies that this
is not due to selection of different types
of workers in outsourced employment
relationships or to differences in the
types of jobs that outsourced workers
do. Instead, it appears that outsourced
workers receive lower pay because they
are excluded from firm rents that are being
paid to workers at the lead companies.
It is difficult to know why firms decide
to outsource parts of their workforces,
but our evidence indicates that firms that
pay wage premia to their workers are
more likely to outsource. This suggests
that saving on labor costs is part of the
motivation, but other reasons include
comparative advantage of business service
firms in their specialty, cost savings
through economies of scale, and gains in
efficiency through market pressures in
the competitive environment of bidding
for service contracts. It is even more
difficult to know what is driving the longterm increase in outsourcing. Changes
in management philosophy (e.g., a move
toward emphasis on shareholder value in
the 1980s and 1990s) may be of similar
importance as the development of new
technologies makes it easier to rely on
contractors. Understanding this is beyond
the scope of this project but a fruitful area
for future research.
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